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“Security, Inc.”
Privatising Internal Security  
in Post-Communist Poland
Lukasz Wordliczek
Abstact The question of the loss of typical areas of state authority has 
been present in the literature for several decades. This issue is sometimes 
described as ‘governance without a government.’ At the same time, mini-
mal research has been devoted to a more systematic analysis. Such work 
would include the linking up of theory-driven and empirically-rooted re-
search programmes. This study attempts – at least partially – to fill this 
void. This project is threefold: first, some basic definitional problems are 
identified; the public-private distinction and privatising of various sectors 
in post-Communist countries are just two of the most critical. Second, a 
short description of the legal framework is provided. Here, relevant legisla-
tive activities and overseeing procedures are the focus. Third, an empirical 
review reveals several reasons for the private security sector’s success: 1. a 
massive expansion of private ownership and the impotence of state author-
ities to secure it effectively, 2. technological advances and 3. the availability 
of critical resources in the form of people and information.
This study concludes that the post-Communist environment is especially 
favourable and conducive to the private security industry. The main rea-
sons for this include (but are not limited to) the knowledge, experience and 
contacts of former secret police officers.
Keywords: Poland, post-Communist environment, internal security, 
private sector 
Introduction
The loss of the ability of nation states to act is not a new phenomenon. 
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Even in a post-Westphalian world characterised by a state-centrist per-
spective, one may easily find some state-free “empty” spaces. But it is 
only recently that policy scholars have concluded that we may be in 
a situation of ‘governance without a government.’1 Thus, a space for 
privatisation research has opened up, and the group of former Com-
munist countries seems to be one possible area of investigation. This 
study has the following structure: first, key definitions are provided; 
non-state actors, the public-private distinction and privatisation are 
three of the most crucial areas on this point. Second, the legal frame-
work is described briefly with a focus on legislative activities and su-
pervisory procedures. Third, some reasons for the success of the pri-
vate security sector are revealed based on an empirical investigation 
of how the private security market functions in contemporary Poland.
Context: Definitions and Theory
The issue at hand – privatising security policy – is closely related to 
the issue of private and non-state actors (NSAs). Broadly speaking, 
an NSA is any actor that does not have the characteristics of a state.2 
Thus, we may assume that an NSA is an actor that concurrently meets 
the following criteria: 1. it is located outside of a governmental struc-
ture and 2. it does not insist on its exclusive and legitimate right to use 
force. This argument is heavily based on Max Weber’s definition of a 
state, which sees the right to use force legitimately as one of the most 
important features of a state. At the same time, we should recall that 
some NSAs also occasionally use force; terrorist networks and organ-
ised crime groups are just two of the most critical and infamous play-
ers here.3 Consequently, we may assume that NSAs – or more simply, 
private actors – occasionally use force legitimately just as nation-states 
have always done.
The description of a private entity is, however, only complete if we 
juxtapose it with its alter ego—the public entity. The public/private 
distinction may be looked at from different angles. We can, for exam-
ple, apply a “functionalist” framework. Here, public may be to private 
as the ‘whole [is] to the part,’4 and examples include phrases like “public 
opinion,” “public interest” and “public health.” Thus, a public entity is 
often functionally understood as a “state” entity. Furthermore, public 
actors are usually treated as relatively open and accessible to the ma-
jority of members of a given community.5 In contrast, the normative 
approach is probably one of the most widely used; its legal focus allows 
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for an analysis of the issue from the perspective of rights and powers.6 
The public/private distinction is then based on the assumption that 
public (i.e. state) entities, embodied in their officers, represent the in-
terests of the larger group, up to the level of the inclusive “national in-
terest.” On the other hand, private activities serve non-governmental 
bodies and typically aim to achieve the interests of minor actors. The 
point is illustrated, for example, in the US where a piece of 2003 legis-
lation defines an ‘inherently governmental’ activity as 
an activity that is so intimately related to the public interest 
as to mandate performance by government personnel. These 
activities require the exercise of substantial discretion in ap-
plying government authority and/or in making decisions for 
the government. Inherently governmental activities normally 
fall into two categories: the exercise of sovereign government 
authority or the establishment of procedures and processes 
related to the oversight of monetary transactions or entitle-
ments.7
The issue is rather complicated in Poland where there is no single 
piece of legislation on “inherently governmental” activities. However, 
a 1981 statute on government-based enterprises declares in its Article 
7 that public administrative institutions may constitute government 
enterprises.8 Another crucial provision relates to the scope of such en-
terprises: Article 5, thus, stipulates that government enterprises may 
operate activities of two kinds; general ones and those which are pub-
lic services. Whereas the former seem self-evident, the latter call for 
more careful consideration. According to Article 6 of the legislation, 
public services include activities aimed at ‘meeting on-going and un-
remitting public needs’ particularly in the areas of ‘sanitation services, 
urban public transport, energy supplies, state-owned property man-
agement, state-owned forest management, cemetery management and 
culture-related services.’ Security services are not included in the list, 
and thus, they may be treated as activities not reserved for government 
enterprises.
There are occasions when the interests of minor actors (i.e. those 
from a particular social group such as workers in a specific industry) 
are represented by state authority bodies. However, because of this 
state-led component, the agenda here is not treated here as “private” 
but as “public.” Thus, by definition, any state-run activity would be 
seen as a public activity. If this argument seems self-evident, then we 
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should also acknowledge that it is far from being comprehensive.
It is worth mentioning that the public/private distinction has been 
questioned on the basis that it is neither accurate enough nor abso-
lutely complete.9 Since the two kinds of activities are interrelated, it is 
useful to look at them more critically. Can social processes be reduced 
to just the two mentioned dimensions? And, is any activity here exclu-
sively public or private? How, for example, do we situate the Catholic 
Church? By its very name and status as a common and ubiquitous en-
tity, it should be placed in the public realm.10 Furthermore, in prac-
tice, based on the signing of a concordat with a given country, priests 
and nuns may have certain duties analogous to those of civil service 
officers.11 At the same time, however, the Catholic Church is formally 
part of the structure of only one state—the Vatican. Bearing in mind 
the suggestion to define “private” as separate from state activities, 
we should logically acknowledge that the Catholic Church could be 
treated as a private entity since it is institutionally separate from other 
(non-Vatican) states.
Given these ambiguities, we may conclude that an institutional sep-
aration does not necessarily reflect a normative or functional perspec-
tive. This makes it even more difficult to maintain the public/private 
distinction rigidly, and the security sector is one example of this ten-
sion. The issue calls out for an additional category, and the business 
environment may be helpful here with its well-known example of 
public-private partnerships (PPP).12 Thus, the public/private definition 
leaves us with nothing more than a sense that we should acknowledge 
the existence of a certain continuum, a hybrid public-private sphere.13 
By doing so, we will be less prone to reduce policy to just the bureau-
cratic ‘pulling and hauling’ apparent in top-level offices.14
Notwithstanding the above, the role of private entities also draws 
attention to the phenomenon of “privatisation.” Generally, this is asso-
ciated with economics and understood to involve the transfer of some 
goods and services from the state to private entities.15 This economic 
focus is also explicit in the Polish legal framework under 1996 legisla-
tion on the commercialisation and privatisation of government enter-
prises.16
In Central and Eastern Europe, the process of privatisation is widely 
perceived in the context of the transformations of the late 1980s, but 
privatisation is also widely known in many Western socio-economic 
models. Here, privatisation has a twofold sense: it is a synonym for 
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the loss a certain amount of state authority and consequently for the 
“filling of the void” by private entities.17
In considering the reasons for the privatisation process, we may in-
clude:
1. The economic argument: the performing by private actors of 
certain formerly state-held duties allows for the reduction of 
some budget outlays18
2. Public opinion:
a. growing distrust of state authorities
b. declining concern about public affairs, which tend to be 
seen as too abstract, too distant and unrelated to the given 
individual
c. pressure to introduce privately run services which are per-
ceived to be more effective and flexible and better managed
3. Ideology: the need to build an active, participatory civil society
4. The “twilight zone” or “let-someone-else-do-the-dirty-work” 
argument: this is the view that transferring some state activities 
into private hands will avoid scrutiny and accountability or, in 
the official parlance, have “risk-sharing” benefits.19
Privatisation may have various characteristics: first, the supply of 
some former state goods and/or services may be “outsourced” to pri-
vate actors. Private military/security companies (PMSCs) and intelli-
gence activities are just two of the best known examples of this phe-
nomenon. Second, privatisation may be intended to implement rules 
already settled by states.20 Lastly, some private actors may be responsi-
ble for institutionalising rule-making activities.21 The subsequent sec-
tion is devoted to outsourcing.
The Legal Framework
Normative regulations in Poland apply to a range of security-related 
entities/activities including security companies, detective agencies, 
information and intelligence gathering, lobbying and public relation 
services.22 Given the focus of this study, only the first of these is dis-
cussed below.
Basic regulations on security agencies in Poland are contained in 1. 
the Act on the Protection of People and Property which was adopted 
by parliament in 1997 (and has been in force since 27 March 1998)23 
and 2. dozens of executive regulations issued by the Ministry of the 
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Interior and Administration, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry 
of Finance. While the 1997 legislation does not explicitly use any form 
of the term “private security company,” it is clear that its provisions 
apply to all entities, including private ones. Specifically, the legislation 
regulates the following:
• places, buildings and facilities subject to mandatory protection
• establishment and operation of security firms
• business activities within security areas
• market entrance and specific requirements for security compa-
nies
• establishment of a national authority in charge of controls and 
inspections 
• transport of firearms, munitions, explosives and other military 
equipment.
Since a detailed description of all these targets is beyond the scope 
of this study, we will focus instead on the most important items:
The Ministry of the Interior and Administration issues licences to 
private security firms after obtaining the opinion of the regional (local, 
provincial level) police chief bureau. To be granted a permit, applicants 
must be free of any criminal record, court conviction or ascertained 
threat to national security or the personal rights of citizens; they must 
not have had a relevant licence revoked in the last three years or been 
removed from the official company register  because of fraudulent dec-
larations or bankruptcy. Furthermore, individual applicants must be 
at least 21 years of age and have completed secondary-level education.
As well as regulating security firm owners, the 1997 statute sets re-
quirements for company staff, who are divided into two broad catego-
ries: managers and operational officers. The former must:
• be citizens of Poland, the EU, Switzerland or an EFTA country
• be at least 21 years old
• have completed education to at least secondary level
• be eligible to enter into legal contracts
• have no criminal record
• present an endorsement issued by the regional police chief bu-
reau
• present a medical examination report confirming their ability 
to perform their duties
• be trained in the security area (including certain elements of the 
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law).
Operational officers must also meet the above criteria, but they may 
be as young as 18 years old and they do not need to have security train-
ing.
Two critical issues arise here and are probably the most vigorously 
debated: what rights do private security officers have to perform their 
tasks? And what entitles them to carry firearms? It is worth focusing on 
each question in turn.
According to Article 36, Section 1 of the 1997 statute, security guards 
have the right to verify if an individual is allowed to be present in a 
guarded area, to check IDs, to order unauthorised individuals to leave 
an area they have entered and to apprehend and deliver to the state 
police any unauthorised individual who is considered to be ‘presenting 
an outright serious danger to life, health or property.’ In terms of the 
“negative” side of their vocation (i.e. what security companies may not 
do), such staff are forbidden from carrying out a search and/or seizing 
property.
Regarding the second of the debated topics – the right to carry and 
use firearms – another provision declares that security officers are gen-
erally allowed to use firearms and physical force (‘coercive measures’), 
but further regulations apply to this activity. According to such exec-
utive regulations, private security companies require a special licence 
to be issued by the regional police chief. Very detailed legal provisions 
cover the storing of weapons after hours and the keeping of an in-
depth weapons register.24 The array of weapons available to private 
security companies includes pistols, revolvers, rifles, machine pistols, 
shotguns, electric stun guns (tasers) and police batons. According to 
the relevant provisions, security companies may also use dogs but may 
not use horses. 
Article 42 of the 1997 statute stipulates that ‘all security officers, 
when on duty, are treated as public officers and, thus, are protected 
by relevant regulations in the Criminal Code.’ This provision clearly 
relates to the public/private distinction. Here, even private security of-
ficers are covered by the privileges that public officers normally enjoy, 
thus making the distinction even more difficult to maintain in practice.
As mentioned, the 1997 legislation also establishes the relevant na-
tional authorities which are in charge of the control and inspection of 
security firms. The two key institutions here are 1. the Ministry of the 
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Interior and Administration and 2. the regional (local, provincial-level) 
police chief bureau. Both are responsible for imposing administrative 
sanctions while the courts obviously handle any criminal activities. 
Administrative sanctions are basically restricted to the withdrawal of 
company licences and/or the permits of  individual guards; the Minis-
ter of the Interior and Administration may decide on these penalties in 
the following cases:
1. Causing a threat to:
a. the national economic interest
b. state defence or security
c. the safety or personal property of citizens
2. Non-compliance with the 1997 statute
3. Failure to notify the licensing authority about an engagement in 
business operations
4. Failure to keep and/or store records of business operations or 
documentation concerning security employees and agreements 
signed under the executive regulation of the Ministry of the In-
terior and Administration.
Criminal sanctions are covered under part 8 of the 1997 legislation. 
Fines or imprisonment up to two years are envisaged for those who 
perform security duties without a proper licence or who neglect their 
duties. On the other hand, a security officer who acts outside the scope 
of their duties is subject to imprisonment for up to five years. Interest-
ingly enough, following a 2013 amendment, those who hinder super-
vision of security firms’ activities are also subject to imprisonment for 
up to two years.
More specific requirements relate to security personnel’s uniforms, 
badges and IDs, which should be ‘markedly different from those used 
by public officers.’ In sum, the Polish legal framework does not differ-
entiate between public and private security firms; the relevant 1997 
statute applies to both categories of agencies. What appears particu-
larly interesting, however, is that the legislation on security companies 
provides officers with protection equal to that of ‘uniformed public of-
ficers.’ A complete list of relevant institutions is included in the annex 
to this study.
The Private Security Business in PracticeThere are several 
possible avenues for research on the empirical evidence for 
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privatisation.25 Here, the aforementioned “functionalist” and 
“normative” perspectives might both be deployed. The former looks 
at the transfer of some former state activities into private hands 
(“pure” or “strict” privatisation), while the latter would focus on 
legal regulations and specifically the background and qualifications 
of personnel. Because the two dimensions – relevant company 
operations and the staff employed – are palpably interconnected in 
practice, this discussion considers them concurrently.
There are more than 3000 private security companies in Poland 
employing around 200,000 officers.26 When compared to other 
post-Communist countries, the ratio of security staff to the popula-
tion is as follows:
Table 1. Ratios of police and private security forces to the population in 
former post-Communist countries
Country
Police force to 
population ratio
Private security 
force to popula-
tion ratio
Difference between police 
force ratio and private 
security force ratio
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1:217 1:2,295 -2078
Slovenia 1:256 1:326 -70
Slovakia 1:251 1:314 -63
Croatia 1:216 1:276 -60
Lithuania 1:290 1:294 -4
Bulgaria 1:155 1:132 23
Czech Republic 1:238 1:203 35
Serbia 1:218 1:146 72
Estonia 1:412 1:289 123
Latvia 1:300 1:105 195
Poland 1:388 1:190 198
Hungary 1:380 1:125 255
Romania 1:1,050 1:229 821
Source: Confederation of European Security Services (2011).
As shown, the greater the value in the first column is then 0, the 
weaker the public sector is in terms of the ratio of public officers to the 
population. And conversely, the smaller that number is, the stronger 
public sector security forces are. Notwithstanding the huge variations 
in these data, we may surmise that three factors are crucial for the rel-
ative success of private security companies: 1. the huge expansion of 
private ownership and impotence of state authorities to secure it effec-
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tively, 2. the availability of critical resources (people and information) 
and 3. technological advances.27 The first two of these factors seem 
especially important in a post-Communist environment. It is worth 
shedding some light on the Polish case.
The connection between private security staff and former Commu-
nist secret service officers is an open secret. Indeed, many of those who 
were not accepted into the state police or any other law enforcement 
institution after the 1989 checks found a safe haven in one of the secu-
rity agencies. As has been described, the first relevant statutory regu-
lation (the Act on the Protection of People and Property) was adopted 
by parliament in 1997 and came into effect in March 1998 – a full nine 
years after the first Solidarity-based government was created. Inter-
estingly enough, the Act does not apply to detective agencies – anoth-
er sanctuary for many former Communist secret service officers who 
are involved, for example, in debt recovery and information collection 
activities.28 Furthermore, as we have seen, any supervising duties are 
conferred on regional police chiefs based on their discretionary pow-
ers. The power granted to security officers understandably raises ques-
tions: they are empowered with almost the same rights (and weapons) 
as police units, but enjoy much greater leeway. Another controversy 
surrounds the former officers of almost any state agency (see appen-
dix). According to the present regulation, they are free to join any pri-
vate enterprise with no “quarantine” period.29
Generally, taking certain activities out of government hands and 
transferring them to private entities raises a number of issues. Of these, 
one seems to be of special importance for security privatisation: ac-
countability.30 Since security companies are authorised to use coercive 
measures and even lethal force, the issue of scrutiny is by no means 
a minor one. The above-described structure in Poland makes it espe-
cially favourable for those who have been on the scene for many years. 
The existence of established social networks enables former officers 
to find a place when they are no longer performing their duties. This 
makes the issue even more fascinating: it turns out that the fundamen-
tal rationale for privatisation, economics, does not apply here. Typical-
ly, the logic would follow the well-known profit-oriented pattern for 
any commercial activity: if you pay, you’ll get the service. However, the 
post-Communist environment privileges its human resources, making 
non-economic factors also an important part of private security com-
panies’ activities. The role of the above-mentioned networks of former 
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law enforcement officers and their contacts proves this point.
Conclusion
Privatisation, like probably any social process, has its limitations and 
may result in unwelcome effects. Costs such as the accumulating of 
power by former state officials and corruption allegations are at the top 
of this list.31 The Polish case is no exception.
The above analysis shows that the Polish experience has been 
marked by circumstances that assisted many former (mainly Commu-
nist) law enforcement officers to find a safe place when leaving office. 
It is not unimportant here that the 1997 statute was drafted and passed 
by a post-Communist left-wing majoritarian parliament. It should be 
recalled, however, the pre-1997 period was filled with media coverage 
of the security industry and its mafia connections: money laundering, 
bribes, racketeering, blackmailing, prostitution, drug trafficking and 
illegal debt collection were not unusual in this context. Since the 1997 
legislation, the private security business has been less scandal-prone 
(i.e. it is more civilised). At the same time, however, former security of-
ficers remain an important component of the sector. The transformed 
environment has been especially favourable and conducive to the pri-
vate security industry. The main reasons for this include but are not 
confined to the knowledge, experience and contacts of former police 
officers.
The security industry in Poland has been treated just like any other 
business sector: given the free market orientation since 1989, it has 
been subject to privatisation activities. This stands in direct opposition 
to Western experiences, which are based on the view that private po-
licing is more than just the “outsourcing” of a given state domain. As 
some commentators have noted, this means that the private interests 
at play may sometimes be ‘inconsistent with, or even in conflict with, 
the public order proclaimed by the state.’32 Furthermore, the free mar-
ket paradigm may indeed be an ‘effective form of regulation, but oper-
ate best where there is competition, an expectation of repeat encoun-
ters, and a free flow of information.’33 It is striking that in the security 
environment hardly any of these requirements are met.
***
Annex. Law enforcement institutions whose officers have the right to 
use coercive measures and firearms:
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1. Homeland security agency (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrzne-
go)
2. Intelligence agency  (Agencja Wywiadu)
3. Government protection bureau (Biuro Ochrony Rządu)
4. Customs service (Służba Celna)
5. Central anti-corruption bureau (Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne)
6. Revenue control (Kontrola Skarbowa)
7. State anti-poaching hunting office (Państwowa Straż Łowiecka)
8. State anti-poaching fishing office (Państwowa Straż Rybacka)
9. State police 
10. Army counterintelligence service (Służba Kontrwywiad Wo-
jskowego)
11. Prison service (Służba Więzienna)
12. Army intelligence service (Służba Wywiadu Wojskowego)
13. Municipal police 
14. Border guard patrol (Straż Graniczna)
15. State forest ranger service (Straż Leśna)
16. Parliamentary police guard service (Straż Marszałkowska)
17. Railroad protection guards service (Służba Ochrony Kolei)
18. National park ranger service (Straż Parku)
19. Military gendarmerie (Żandarmeria Wojskowa)
20. Security officers under the statute dated 22 August 1997
21. Road patrol service (Inspekcja Transportu Drogowego)
Source: Article 2.1 of the statute dated 24 May 2013: Use of coercive instruments and 
firearms (Ustawa z dnia 24 maja 2013 r. o środkach przymusu bezpośredniego i broni 
palnej; Dz. U. z 2013 r. poz. 628, 1165, z 2014 r. poz. 24, 1199).
***
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